During the “Ukrainian Lunch” at the Munich Security Conference, Commissioner Marta Kos became the first European Commission official to publicly discuss the possibility of Ukraine joining the EU already in 2027.“Under the current methodology, January 1, 2027 is not a possible date for Ukraine’s accession to the EU. But we must find solutions to bridge the gap between the merit-based principle and the methodology we have applied over the last 40 years, on the one hand, and geopolitical challenges, on the other. We can no longer wait,” she stated.For Ukraine, this is very good news, as it elevates the discussion of alternative approaches to enlargement policy to a new level.The idea of accelerated accession is no longer merely a theoretical reflection among experts.Moreover, it is gradually transforming into a search for a practical mechanism for implementation.At the same time, at least three significant challenges are likely to emerge in the near future.

First Challenge: Giving Substance to Accelerated Membership

It is obvious that Ukraine (and likely other candidate countries) cannot complete the full scope of reforms required for full accession by 2027.So how would accelerated membership be implemented? Several ideas are currently under discussion.One of them, tentatively referred to as “reverse enlargement,” suggests that Ukraine would be formally recognized as an EU member immediately, while the practical substance of membership would gradually expand as reforms are implemented.Another idea, proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron, envisions a “two-speed Europe.” It is evident that Ukraine would receive voting rights on certain (not all) EU decisions only at a later stage.At the same time, it remains unclear how access to the EU single market and funds would be opened, as well as how Ukraine would participate at the technical level within EU institutions.It is entirely possible that even if membership in 2027 were realized, it would initially be largely formal, with Ukraine’s real integration into EU life beginning only after substantial reform progress sufficient to close all negotiation chapters.Neither an accelerated nor a standard enlargement methodology would eliminate the requirement to fully implement the EU acquis and properly prepare Ukrainian institutions.As Marta Kos stated in Tallinn on February 13: “Full membership is possible only after full implementation of reforms.”

Second Challenge: Internal Political Dynamics in the EU

Any change to the enlargement methodology — and accelerated membership would inevitably require such changes — demands unanimous approval by all EU member states.Reaching such consensus is difficult. For example, if Viktor Orbán wins elections in Hungary again, his position could become a serious obstacle.Resistance to the idea of accelerated membership could also arise in other countries.According to Eurobarometer 2025, the lowest levels of support for enlargement among EU countries are in Czechia, France, and Austria, where fewer than half of respondents support admitting new members.The situation might become easier for Ukraine if accelerated enlargement also included other candidate countries.In that case, supporters of Moldova’s accession or that of Western Balkan countries might be more willing to accept changes to the enlargement methodology.It would also be easier for the European Commission to justify such changes if they applied to all candidate countries rather than exclusively to Ukraine.This point was emphasized by Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, who stated that he “supports Ukraine, but these changes must apply to everyone, which would mean a major wave of enlargement unlike anything the EU has seen in many years.”Even if consensus is achieved and a new enlargement wave including Ukraine is approved, the EU will still need to undertake internal reform.This reform must address financial issues (including the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion policy), since enlargement would require redistribution of resources to accommodate new members.It must also include institutional reform to address misuse of veto rights (since 2011, the veto has been used 45 times in the EU, 19 of those by Hungary) and adjustments to the organization of the European Commission, including potentially reducing the number of Commissioners.So far, however, the European Commission has not presented concrete proposals for such internal reform.

Third Challenge: Geopolitical Uncertainty

The idea of accelerated accession emerged as part of potential security guarantees for Ukraine within ongoing peace negotiations. But what if a peace agreement cannot be reached at this stage?Will the idea remain viable outside a specific geopolitical context?Ukraine is unquestionably an important security partner for the EU, and deeper engagement in security cooperation benefits both sides.But will the EU’s security needs alone be sufficient to justify Ukraine’s accession to the single market and full membership?Former European Commission President José Manuel Barroso once noted that “the creativity of European lawyers is limitless when there is real need.”One can only hope that shaping new accession rules will require not only creativity but also political consensus — restoring to enlargement policy the powerful geopolitical influence it once had.