In response to public pressure following the adoption of the controversial Law No. 4555 — which significantly limited the independence of NABU and SAPO in favor of expanding the powers of the Prosecutor General — the Parliament and the President registered three alternative draft laws aimed at restoring the autonomy of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions.

What are the differences between the draft laws? What are the flaws of each, and which is the least problematic? The answers can be found in the analysis by the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform.

After Law No. 4555 “On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding Specifics of Pre-Trial Investigation of Criminal Offenses Related to Disappearances Under Martial Law” came into force, thousands of people across Ukraine took to the streets demanding the restoration of NABU and SAPO’s independence.

On July 24, Members of Parliament and the President registered three draft laws in the Verkhovna Rada: Nos. 13531, 13531-1, and 13533. All three are aimed at restoring the status quo for NABU and SAPO.

Draft laws 13531 and 13531-1, submitted by MPs, are nearly identical and propose reverting the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office” to the versions that were in effect prior to the adoption of Law No. 4555. The only difference is that 13531-1 introduces a requirement for NABU employees to undergo certification under procedures established by the Cabinet of Ministers. Those who refuse or fail to complete the procedure would be dismissed. The necessity and purpose of such ad hoc certification is unclear, given that NABU already has an Internal Control Department responsible for conducting internal investigations, monitoring employee lifestyles, and checking for breaches of ethical standards.

The President’s draft law, No. 13533, does restore NABU and SAPO’s independence, but still grants the Prosecutor General broad powers. These include the authority to issue binding written instructions to heads of investigative bodies (except NABU) to provide case materials. If a head of an investigative body or an investigator fails to comply, the case can be reassigned. This essentially reinstates the Soviet-era supervisory role of the Prosecutor General over criminal proceedings and further centralizes power within the prosecution system.

Additionally, the President proposes that disputes over jurisdiction in cases potentially falling under the Bureau of Economic Security (BES) be resolved by the Prosecutor General or their acting replacement. While this may be less problematic if the BES is led by an independent official, the potential for abuse remains.

If adopted, draft law 13533 would also allow simplified procedures for appointing prosecutors during martial law and for dismissing them if they decline reassignment to a vacant or temporarily vacant position. These provisions are problematic, as they could lead to the hiring of less qualified but more loyal prosecutors and increase corruption risks. Furthermore, such simplified appointments and dismissals would also apply to SAPO.

As previously noted, the amendments introduced by Law No. 4555 have enabled manual control over the prosecution system, weakened prosecutor independence, and partially rolled back previous reforms.

The President’s draft also includes provisions for polygraph testing of NABU, SAPO, BES, Prosecutor General’s Office, SBI, National Police employees with access to state secrets — allegedly to detect ties to the aggressor state. However, polygraph tests are not scientifically reliable and may violate human dignity as guaranteed by Article 28 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which prohibits medical or scientific testing without free consent.

Another concerning provision is the proposal to prohibit all NABU employees from traveling abroad, except for official business trips. Currently, such restrictions only apply to civil servants who are reserved during mobilization or wartime. This could lead to excessive control over NABU personnel, limit their international cooperation, and infringe on personal rights, such as accessing medical treatment abroad.

All three draft laws propose removing the unconstitutional provision in the CPC that allowed warrantless searches — enabling prosecutors, investigators, and operatives to seize evidence without court authorization. However, the current and proposed language still needs revision. The Constitution allows such actions only in urgent cases to save lives or prevent crime, whereas the CPC uses the broader term “criminal offense,” which includes minor offenses not rising to the level of crimes.

In summary: all three draft laws would help restore NABU and SAPO’s independence, but 13531-1 and 13533 require further refinement — especially 13533, which includes provisions that may be used to exert pressure on investigators and prosecutors. Therefore, according to the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada, these bills cannot be adopted in one day as both the basis and in full (Article 102.4 and Article 114.2). Thus, preference should be given to draft law 13531.