Traditionally, the problem of economic sanctions in the public space is explicitly discussed in relation to Russia. But at the same time, Belarus is hardly mentioned. However, Belarus is the same aggressor as Russia. Why? According to Article 3 of UN Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974, “regardless of the declaration of war, provided and following the provisions of Article 2, it qualifies as an act of aggression … The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State”. Therefore, it is necessary to keep it in mind.

The history of sanctions against Belarus has two stages. The first stage is sanctions related to human rights violations, repression against the opposition, massive falsifications during the presidential elections and brutal suppression of civil protests. It should be noted that the sanctions policy was quite flexible. On October 29, 2015, the Council of the EU suspended until February 29, 2016, the freezing of assets and the ban on entry for 170 people, the freezing of assets of three companies from Belarus. The reason for such a decision was the release of all Belarusian political prisoners on August 22, 2015, and improving relations between the EU and Belarus. In addition, the EU admitted that on October 11, 2015, presidential elections were generally free.

The EU has introduced six packages of sanctions against 195 natural and 35 legal entities. They provide for the freezing of their assets, the prohibition of EU citizens and companies from providing financial means to sanctioned persons, the prohibition of persons on the sanctions list from entering the EU, etc. Other countries have introduced similar sanctions.

The second stage is sanctioning in connection with the participation of Belarus in Russian aggression against Ukraine, which representatives of the world community began to apply with the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The EU introduced such sanctions already at the beginning of March. Among other things, we are talking about the embargo and import of wood products, cement products, iron and steel products, and rubber products from Belarus. The EU banned the export to Belarus of weapons, special equipment for internal repression, equipment, technology or software, dual-use products and technologies, goods and technologies intended for the development of military production and technology, or the defense and security sector. The EU also banned Belarusian transport companies from road access within the EU. According to EU estimates, trade restrictions affected 70% of imports from Belarus. As of today, the EU has used almost all traditional sanctions instruments.

In fact, in 2021, the EU was Belarus’s second leading trading partner (19.9% of the country’s merchandise exports and imports), while Russia accounted for 49.0% of Belarus’ foreign trade turnover. At the same time, bilateral trade increased by 27.0% in 2021, reaching EUR 12.9 billion, after a drop of 7.3% in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Therefore, the economy of Belarus has traditionally depended on special political and economic ties with Russia, which preserved the inefficiency of the Belarusian political and economic system. We are talking, in particular, about privileged conditions for the supply of energy carriers and multibillion-dollar loans, which no one will return. Sanctions against Belarus force the country to look for economic assistance in Russia. Therefore, when analyzing the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy, one should consider how restrictive measures affect Russia’s ability to support Belarus economically.

On January 16 of this year, the European Parliament adopted a resolution to create a special tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine to punish the senior political leadership of Russia and its allies. At the same time, it was emphasized that such a tribunal should have jurisdiction to investigate the relevant crimes of Oleksandr Lukashenka and his accomplices. On January 26, the PACE unanimously demanded the creation of a special international criminal tribunal in The Hague to prosecute Russian and Belarusian political and military leaders who “planned, prepared, initiated or carried out” Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine.

In my opinion, the consequence of this decision should lead to one particular step — the demand that Belarus pays reparations to Ukraine for aggression against our country. After all, the current behavior of Belarus fully corresponds to the definition of aggression mentioned earlier. As for sanctions, as in the case of Russia, in the future their lift should be strictly conditioned by compensatory payments in favor of Ukraine from the aggressors.

The goals of the EU sanctions policy against Belarus are obvious.

This is, first of all, the intention to undermine the economic potential of the aggressor, thereby forcing Belarus to refuse participation in Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Second, preventing the possibility of using Belarus to circumvent international sanctions against Russia. I share the opinion that other things being equal, these goals can be realized by introducing a package of sanctions against Belarus similar to those against Russia. By the way, this idea was expressed last October by Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Ireland.

Today, this idea is entering the stage of practical implementation. At the beginning of this year, the EU announced its intention to introduce targeted sanctions against Belarus and Iran in connection with the support of Russian aggression. According to Bloomberg, the EU plans to bring the sanctions policy against Belarus in line with the sanctions against the Russian Federation. The Belarusian package will include restrictions on exporting dual-purpose goods and technologies to Belarus; sanctions on trade in oil, coal, metal products, and gold; restrictions on exporting luxury goods, investments, and the provision of certain services. The sanctions will also affect the aviation and energy sectors and key financial sources.

It remains to be seen to what extent the “Belarusian” package will be coordinated with the 10th package of EU sanctions against Russia. In my opinion, these packets must go out synchronously. It is also essential for us to understand how certain European politicians — sympathizers of Russia — will behave in this case.

At the same time, the sanctions against Russia and Belarus contain several exceptions regarding the supply of medicines, trade in agricultural products and food products, and financial transactions with sanctioned persons. It is evident that this approach will remain in the future.

The effectiveness of sanctions depends on how the sanctions regime is implemented. EU legislation provides specific opportunities to punish anyone who helps sanctioned persons circumvent sanctions against Russia and Belarus. But until now, at least to me, there are no known cases of such punishments, despite the availability of information about relevant violations, which undermines confidence in the effectiveness of the management of the sanctions process.

The last time the EU introduced targeted sanctions against Belarus was in July last year. Therefore, the expectations from the content and scope of the “Belarusian” package are pretty high. After all, Belarus will not be able to compensate for the loss of the EU market.

Ihor Burakovskyi, Chairman of the Board, The Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, for NV