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How can Ukraine increase its chances of being invited to the NATO Summit in Washington next year?
Ukraine aimed to receive a political invitation to join the Alliance during the recent Vilnius Summit. One of the reasons why the Ukrainians failed to achieve this goal was, in part, that the Ukrainian authorities started consultations with NATO partners too late. Many observers (some deliberately) confused the request of official Kyiv: the Ukrainians seemed to be asking for membership rather than an invitation.
The next NATO summit is scheduled for July 2024. If Ukraine wants a positive response in a year, it is crucial to do the necessary work now. The New Europe Center has asked well-known Western experts for advice on how Ukraine can best make security and foreign policy decisions in the context of NATO.
Ukraine has already begun preparations for the NATO Washington Summit, which will take place in July 2024. And on this path, it is essential to understand our main challenges and tasks in order not to repeat the mistake of Vilnius:
1. Risks of non-alignment.
The decision in Washington will largely depend on the success of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, the situation at the front in general, and Russia’s weakness. However, the discussion should include the risks of Ukraine’s membership and the chances of Ukraine’s non-membership. Without Ukraine’s membership, the region will remain vulnerable, with instability and chaos as its defining characteristics.
2. Informal work should begin now.
Informal negotiations on the “conditions” or “criteria” for an invitation should begin now (with an agreement on a fast-track path to membership once these conditions are met). Ukraine should cooperate with the countries of Central Europe and Scandinavia to create a kind of “lobby group” that would promote the idea of NATO membership. It is undoubtedly essential to expand the circle of friends in both the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States.
3. Find the correct arguments.
Ukraine’s future allies must understand that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is not a burden (or a “trap”) but an advantage. For example, the United States may be receptive to the argument that Ukraine’s combat experience aligns with NATO’s strategic vision. According to defense plans, the Alliance should be ready to deploy 100,000 combat-ready troops within ten days. The first line of defense will be European, and Ukraine can play a crucial role here.
4. The benefits of the NATO-Ukraine Council.
This joint body, launched during the Vilnius Summit, should become more than a political forum. It could turn into a platform for discussion and agreement on the necessary criteria, eventually leading to an invitation and then membership in NATO.
5. Seize the opportunities of the interim period.
The United States insists that Ukraine receive multilateral support to strengthen its defense capabilities without focusing on the issue of NATO membership. According to Washington, the question of membership (or even an invitation) in the Alliance can only be raised after the war is over. However, Ukraine should strengthen its interoperability with NATO in various areas to join the Alliance as soon as circumstances allow. All security models (assurances, commitments, “guarantees”) offered as substitutes for NATO membership should be of an interim, temporary nature.
So, how can Ukraine increase its chances of being invited to the NATO summit in Washington next year? The New Europe Center asked this question to American and European experts.
The Vilnius Summit showed that Ukraine and NATO member states operate under different conceptual frameworks. Everyone, including President Zelenskyy, agrees that Ukraine cannot join NATO until the war ends. However, Ukraine still wants to receive an invitation now, believing this would send a clear signal to the Kremlin. Most Allies, including the United States, view an invitation differently: as a treaty obligation. They believe that issuing an invitation when there is no clear path to follow – in other words, when there is no end to the war in sight – could damage the credibility of the Alliance.2 Ukraine’s request for a clear timetable for joining the Alliance contradicts this view: Allies do not want to make a promise they cannot keep.
That is why the United States insists on establishing multilateral framework agreements to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities on an interim basis. As Ukraine prepares for the Washington Summit, it should focus on making these interim measures as robust as possible and linked to the NATO accession process. Ukraine has two main goals: to make the Ukrainian army stronger and better able to withstand Russian aggression and to align Ukraine’s military doctrine, tactics, and defense procurement with those of the Alliance. Achieving these goals will put Ukraine in the best position to join the Alliance after the war.
Ukraine has put forward a compelling diplomatic case for joining NATO. The issue of Ukraine’s accession has been put on the agenda in a new way in 2023. It became the main point of discussion at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius. Not only are policymakers now well versed in (current and future) NATO-Ukraine relations, but this new knowledge has permeated the general public debate on European security in the United States and across Europe. Ukrainian diplomacy has done all it can do, and a certain conceptual threshold has been crossed in Washington and European capitals.
Therefore, the task facing Ukraine today is not exclusively diplomatic. It does not lie in the realm of strategic communication. It is a military task. Working with its partners, many of whom are NATO members, Ukraine must achieve two goals before moving closer to membership. First, Ukraine must regain as much territory as possible, invulnerable to Russian attacks. Second, Ukraine must develop a sense of futility in Moscow, the Kremlin, and among ordinary Russian citizens. When Russia realizes that it has nothing to gain from continuing the war and that it is pointless, the conditions will be in place not only for the conflict to end but also for NATO to open its doors to Ukraine.
The outcome of the Vilnius Summit did not meet the expectations of many Ukrainians (and many supporters of Ukraine’s clear course towards NATO membership). The wording of the Vilnius Summit lacked clarity. It did not specify an exact date or a straightforward process for joining NATO but opened the way to membership, as no member of the Alliance objected in principle. It is now crucial to build on this result for further progress:
One of the main reasons for Washington’s indecision on Ukraine’s membership in NATO is its concern that by joining NATO, Ukraine would become a burden to the US military without a reliable European “backbone” in the Alliance. The US leadership is increasingly concerned about this prospect, given the fact that both Republicans and Democrats are eager to finally make a pivot to Asia so that the US can focus its efforts on deterring possible Chinese aggression against Taiwan.
The good news is that this obstacle is not absolute; it can be overcome. Within NATO, Ukraine’s supporters should emphasize that the Alliance’s first line of defense will be predominantly European – according to the NATO force model, a 100,000-strong contingent should be ready for combat in less than ten days. In addition, as Ukraine acceded to the EU, its defense complex will be integrated into the EU’s defense technology and industrial base. These measures will mean that Ukraine’s accession to NATO is not a “trap” for US troops but a crucial element of the European defense line. It would be unwise to treat Ukraine differently from other European allies.
The most promising way for Ukraine’s political invitation to NATO is a military victory for Ukraine. The balance of power should look favorable to Ukraine: a strong Ukraine and a weak Russia.
But this is not enough. Two fears must be overcome. The biggest fear in Washington and Berlin is Russian escalation, which could lead to war with the West. The other worry is that Ukraine might not act responsibly in its relations with Russia.
However, the debate should not only be about the risks of membership but also the risks of non-membership. Without NATO membership, Ukraine must build up its armaments (possibly even acquire nuclear weapons), or the entire region will plunge into instability and chaos.
Kyiv should cooperate with Central European and Scandinavian countries to create a lobbying bloc to promote Ukraine’s interests. It is also essential to engage with representatives of the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States.
Many in the West fear when Russia finally realizes it cannot conquer Ukraine again. That is why it is vital to make NATO membership a phased process, where transitioning to membership is not perceived as a severe problem at a particular time.
Ultimately, Ukraine will gain NATO membership when the prevailing view is that Russia would not risk going to war with the United States over Ukraine – and that the risks of Ukraine’s non-membership are far greater than the potential risks of membership.
The material was prepared with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The material reflects the authors’ position and does not necessarily coincide with the part of the International Renaissance Foundation.
