After the tragedy on January 18 with the death of the Ministry of Internal Affairs leadership in Brovary, which shocked not only the Police and the National Guard but the entire society, many fears arose about maintaining stability in the internal affairs system. Today, the Parliament appointed Ihor Klymenko, who performed the Minister’s duties being the Head of the National Police, as the Minister of Internal Affairs. The state has taken legally necessary actions, and that’s good.
De facto, the internal affairs system has hundreds of thousands of employees and five bodies (National Guard, National Police, State Emergency Service, Border, and Migration Services), so the personal charisma or management style of the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs influences, but does not determine actions. Moreover, after the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ depoliticization in 2015, the position of “minister of police” no longer exists, and the Ministry itself performs (at least tries to) a political function, not an administrative one.
Therefore, it is better to scrutinize the system itself: what it looks like now and what lies ahead for it. Did the Ministry of Internal Affairs units find a balance between the war and their everyday peaceful tasks, including the reformat towards a qualitative cleansing of the system?
The year 2022 became a test for the whole country — all government bodies adapted their functions to wartime needs, especially the bodies in the national security and defense system. The Ministry of Internal Affairs coordinates the actions of five bodies directly involved in repelling the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, as well as in ensuring order in the rear, improving life in the de-occupied territories, etc.
It is already possible to state the following:
First, the availability of personnel stability at the senior management level. Due to several successful governmental decisions on January 18 and 20, the acting Minister of Internal Affairs and the Head of the National Police were appointed. Meanwhile, the situation in which Ihor Klymenko handled both the Ministry and the National Police for more than two weeks damaged the effectiveness of the entire MIA system simply because its Head did not have enough time to combine positions and transit the work cases. That is why he was appointed on February 7 as the acting Minister. It is a correct solution that will make it possible to shorten transitional periods and ensure political stability.
It has to be noted that the Minister and the Head of the Police are two positions with different functions: the former is a political position (in particular forming state policy, representing the interests of bodies in the government, etc.), and the latter performs managerial functions (operational management of the separate body). That is the achievement of the already mentioned depoliticization of 2015. True, it still needs to be completed because, contrary to the classic European model, the Minister of Internal Affairs influences personnel appointments in the Police. For example, he approves the appointments of heads of regional departments. Considering the difference in functions of the positions of the Minister and the Head of the Police, it is difficult to say whether the experience of managing the Police provides significant advantages in the performance of the Minister’s political functions. He provides knowledge of the system, which is a significant advantage, but on the other hand, it always creates risks that the interests of his former department will prevail over the interests of other bodies of the MIA system. But looking for candidates during the war is a difficult task, so this is the correct solution: appoint someone who has already taken over part of the tasks as soon as possible. It is also necessary to appoint the Head of the National Police as quickly as possible.
Secondly, the actual functions performed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies have significantly shifted towards responding to the challenges posed by the war. It seems obvious but still worth mentioning because the new situation directly affects the role of the MIA. First of all, it is about militarization – the National Guard, which has mixed functions of internal security and protection of public order, is now mainly focused on providing the defense forces with specialized personnel. The same is true in other bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: for all those who wanted to defend the country “on the front lines,” transit conditions to the Armed Forces of Ukraine units were created.
Significant resources of the Police and the State Emergency Service are used to support security in the rear, preserve and restore critical infrastructure, restore the functioning of authorities in de-occupied territories by implementing priority security measures, demining territories, fixing damage to housing, etc.
At the same time, the border and migration services strengthen border protection, work more thoroughly with migration measures, and generally try to provide quality services to Ukrainian citizens under challenging conditions.
We are not talking about this much, but credit should be given to the police officers actively investigating war crimes. Moreover, the primary investigative actions usually rest on their shoulders. And this includes the discovery of the bodies of Ukrainians tortured by the Russians, the exhumation of mass graves, and the psychological support of people in the liberated territories, etc. This is quite a psychological challenge for everyone, and the Police, due to its regional presence and a significant number of human resources, is maximally involved in these processes, without which no investigation and prosecution of the guilty are possible.
But! No one has abolished crime – from theft and robbery, fraud, and traffic accidents with victims to cyber attacks, which has increased significantly. However, the resources of the system are limited. First of all, these are specialists who focus more on issues of national security rather than domestic crime. The investigation results (known as “detection rates”) have decreased as expected. However, mainly in those previously problematic areas, for example, apartment robberies or fraud with bank transfers (now pseudo-volunteers who actively parasitize on the war have been added). The biggest problem ahead is the deterioration of the socio-economic situation, demobilization, and illegal circulation of weapons and ammunition. It is necessary to prepare in advance for these negative companions of war.
Therefore, the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs today perform not only civil functions but also provide armed resistance to the aggressor, maintain order in the rear and restore life in the de-occupied territories, and perform functions in the field of criminal prosecution.
Thirdly, previous criticisms regarding illegal work practices or evidence of corruption remain relevant. Therefore, the need for development cannot be denied, even in war conditions. The self-cleaning process, primarily through disciplinary procedures, is frozen, and manifestations of corruption are carefully suppressed. It seems that only under the pressure of the Europeans and the Americans, investigations have intensified in the last two weeks, mainly related to corruption schemes in customs, procurement, and humanitarian affairs. Unfortunately, all these crimes have dozens and hundreds of accomplices, including within the MIA system.
Postponing it until peacetime is wrong not only in terms of morality but also in terms of political necessity. We have to fulfill the Recommendations of the European Union regarding the accession of Ukraine, given on June 17, 2022. One of them directly concerns the Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies, namely part of Recommendation No. 4 — “to adopt a comprehensive strategic plan for reforming the entire law and order sector as part of the security environment of Ukraine.”
On January 11, 2023, Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin reported that the Interdepartmental Working Group developed a project of the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Reform of Law Enforcement Agencies as a Part of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine for 2023-2027 and sent it to the Office of the President of Ukraine for study and further approval by the President’s decree.
Among other things, the strategic priorities of reforming law enforcement agencies include: ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement agencies as an integral component of the security and defense sector, within which they ensure the national security of Ukraine, including public safety and order, combating crime; development of a result-oriented management system per established priorities; the comprehensive digital transformation of the system, as well as openness, transparency, accountability, independence, and its political neutrality.
What is behind these official declarations? Continuation of the same reforms that were not completed after the Revolution of Dignity. We have new bodies or units, such as patrol police or service centers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but it is difficult to say that they form a single system. There are new and old structures and new and old personnel that coexist. And this is a problem because, after the end of the war, we will start again the old story of “cleaning,” “certification,” and “reboot.”
It is almost impossible to do this successfully, it is often simply unconstitutional, so it is better to change the internal structure: for example, reform the criminal unit of the Police, combine the positions of investigator and operational worker, introduce a transparent evaluation system based on the criteria of the quality of work, and only then look, how people “get by” in these new conditions. If effective evaluation and disciplinary action systems are in place, ineffective law enforcement officers will naturally be dismissed as underperforming.
It is no wonder that so much has been said about depoliticization – the excessive political influence remains, and this is one of the biggest challenges for such a large-scale system as the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The process of militarization mentioned above will have the effect that the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs system will remain the critical power block of the state responsible for internal security for a long time. At the same time, bad personnel decisions, tolerance for corruption, or simply not responding to systemic problems can create situations where this resource will be used against Ukrainians. Therefore, today we are engaged in de-oligarchization, but at the same time, we must remember that the bodies that have a monopoly on the use of force also need careful attention.
At the same time, it should be clarified that the position of the EU is that our Plan as a candidate for the EU should refer to peacetime. Therefore, it did not include the problematic issues of law enforcement agencies functioning in war conditions, military justice, a policy of de-occupation, and the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine (in terms of security measures). Is it critical? In fact, no, if in parallel with this document, there is a high-quality state (public) policy on the issues listed above. Because one thing is what kind of law and order system Europeans want to see (indeed, it is a peacetime system), and another is what challenges war poses to it today and how we can preserve the law and order system until peacetime.
Thus, despite the stability of the Ministry of Internal Affairs system in wartime conditions, it should not be the result of sporadic efforts of good leaders or the grassroots initiative of subordinates but part of a stable, consistent, effective state policy in the wartime.
Eugene Krapyvin, expert of the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform, for ZN.UA